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ABSTRACT
Privacy-preserving techniques for distributed computation
have been proposed recently as a promising framework in
collaborative inter-domain network monitoring. Several dif-
ferent approaches exist to solve such class of problems, e.g.,
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Secure Multiparty Com-
putation (SMC) based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing algorithm
(SSS). Such techniques are complete from a computation-
theoretic perspective: given a set of private inputs, it is
possible to perform arbitrary computation tasks without re-
vealing any of the intermediate results. In fact, HE and SSS
can operate also on secret inputs and/or provide secret out-
puts. However, they are computationally expensive and do
not scale well in the number of players and/or in the rate
of computation tasks. In this paper we advocate the use of
“elementary” (as opposite to “complete”) Secure Multiparty
Computation (E-SMC) procedures for traffic monitoring. E-
SMC supports only simple computations with private input
and public output, i.e., it can not handle secret input nor
secret (intermediate) output. Such a simplification brings
a dramatic reduction in complexity and enables massive-
scale implementation with acceptable delay and overhead.
Notwithstanding its simplicity, we claim that an E-SMC
scheme is sufficient to perform a great variety of compu-
tation tasks of practical relevance to collaborative network
monitoring, including, e.g., anonymous publishing and set
operations. This is achieved by combining a E-SMC scheme
with data structures like Bloom Filters and bitmap strings.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving techniques for distributed computation
have been proposed recently as a promising tool in collab-
orative inter-domain network monitoring — see, e.g., the
motivating paper by Roughan and Zhang [19]. In the refer-
ence scenario, a set of ISPs are unwilling to share local traffic
data due to business sensitivity and/or concerns about their
users’ privacy. On the other hand, they have a collective
interest to perform some global computation on such data
and share the final result. For example, they might want
to aggregate local traffic measurements in order to recon-
struct global statistics, and these might be further processed
in order to unveal global threats (e.g., botnets) or discover
macroscopic anomalies. As pointed out already in [8], each
ISP would benefit from comparing its own local view (of traf-
∗This is an extended version of the paper presented at the
Third International Workshop on Traffic Monitoring and
Analysis (TMA’11), Vienna, 27 April 2011.
fic conditions) with the global view aggregated over all other
ISPs, especially in the occasion of anomalies and alarms, in
order to hint at whether the (unknown) root cause is lo-
cal or global— a major discriminator for deciding about the
reaction. Also, ISPs might be ready to share with other
ISPs information about security incidents observed locally,
provided that they can do so anonymously.
Two possible approaches to solve such class of problems
are Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Secure Multiparty
Computation (SMC) based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing algo-
rithm (SSS for short). Both these techniques are “complete”
from a computation-theoretic perspective1: given a set of
private inputs, it is possible, in principle, to compute any ar-
bitrary function, including structured algorithms involving
conditional statements, without revealing any of the inter-
mediate results. In fact, a distinguishing feature of HE and
SSS is that they can operate also on secret inputs and/or
provide secret outputs (see the graphical representation in
Fig. 1(a)). The notions of secret and private are distinct:
private data is known in cleartext to at least one player (and
usually only to one), while secret data remains unknown by
all players and can not be reconstructed unless a minimum
number of players agree to do so. On the other hand, such
techniques are computationally expensive — especially HE
— and therefore do not scale well in the rate of computation
tasks (queries) and/or in the number of players.
In this paper we advocate the use of “elementary” (as op-
posite to “complete”) SMC procedures for collaborative traf-
fic monitoring. Such techniques — hereafter referred to as
E-SMC for short — have a fundamental limit: they support
only simple computations with private inputs and public out-
put, i.e., they can not handle secret input nor secret (inter-
mediate) output. We show that such a simplification allows
for an enormous reduction in computational complexity and
overhead, making such techniques amenable to massive-scale
implementation. Notwithstanding its simplicity, we claim
that E-SMC is sufficient to perform a broad variety of tasks
of practical importance in the field of collaborative traffic
monitoring. In fact, queries can be chained to build more
structured computation tasks (ref. Fig. 1(b)) whenever in-
termediate results — which are necessarily public in E-SMC
— are not regarded as sensitive. Moreover, we show that an
additive E-SMC scheme can be combined with local trans-
formations on the private data and/or with particular data
structures (e.g., Bloom Filters, bitmap strings) in order to
1A fully homomorphic, computationally complete HE
scheme has been introduced recently by Gentry [12]. The
completeness of SSS is shown in [3].
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extend the range of supported operations.
In this work we take a first step towards unfolding the
potential of E-SMC for traffic monitoring. We make three
main contributions. First, we present a simple scheme for
E-SMC, called GCR, which is based on additive-only or
multiplicative-only secret computation and extends an idea
presented earlier in [2]. Second, we highlight some system-
design aspects of GCR that enable massive-scale implemen-
tation: in particular, we propose to split the computation
into offline randomization and online aggregation phases.
Third, we describe how GCR can support a number of oper-
ations relevant to collaborative traffic monitoring — like set
operations, anonymous publishing and anonymous schedul-
ing — when combined with data structures like Bloom Fil-
ters and bitmap strings.
The aim of this report is not to provide definitive results
nor quantitative assessments, but rather to indicate a direc-
tion of work to researchers engaged in inter-domain traffic
monitoring. We claim that a broad variety of tasks of practi-
cal relevance to this field do not necessitate to resort to“com-
plete” (and complex) privacy-preserving schemes but can be
satisfactorily attained by E-SMC. Thanks to their simplic-
ity, collaborative systems based on E-SMC are amenable
to massive-scale implementation, with very large number of
players and/or very high rate of queries. In turn, system
scalability paves the way towards customer-driven collabo-
rative monitoring, where participating players do not map to
ISPs but rather to their customers — think, e.g., to mid-to-
large companies with own IT security staff. This is indeed a
new avenue of collaborative network monitoring that might
have in E-SMC its enabling technology.
2. THE GCR METHOD
We consider the classical SMC scenario where a set of n
players collaborate to compute a function of some private
data — e.g., traffic statistics, network logs, records of se-
curity incidents. As customary in SMC, we assume a semi-
honest model (also known as honest-but-curious): all players
cooperate honestly to compute the final result, but a subset
of them might collude to infer private information of other
players. In other words, no malicious player will attempt
to interrupt nor corrupt the computation process, e.g., by
providing incorrect input data.
In this section we present a simple method to perform
secure private addition which extends an idea presented ear-
lier by Atallah et al. in [2, §4.1] based on additive secret
sharing. We refer to our method as “Globally-Constrained
Randomization”, GCR for short. We show that GCR, which
is simple conceptually, lends itself very well to massive-scale
implementation. We propose also for the first time a varia-
tion of the scheme to perform secure multiplication.
2.1 Notation
We consider a set of n players {Pi, i = 1 . . . n} with n ≥ 3
(normally n >> 1). The maximum number of colluding
players will be denoted by l (collusion threshold) with l ≤
n − 2. Note that l is a design parameter that can be set
independently from the system size n. For each computation
task (query) each player Pi involves two elements:
• ai is the private input of Pi to the summation. For
some queries, it is obtained by applying a local trans-
formation g() on some other inner private data bi, i.e.,
ai = g(bi).
• ri is the private random element which Pi has previ-
ously generated cooperatively with other players in the
way presented later.
• vi def= ai + ri is the public input which Pi eventually
announces to the other players.
The collection of random elements across all players con-
stitutes a Random Set (RS) and will be denoted by r
def
=
{ri, i = 1 . . . n}. The goal of the computation round is
to obtain the public output result A
def
= f(a1, a2 . . . an) =
f(g(b1), g(b2), ..g(bn)) without disclosing the values of the
individual ai’s. For each computation, all input elements
(ai, ri, vi) and the output A must be in the same format.
For the additive scheme they must be defined over the same
additive commutative group (Abelian group). We will con-
sider the following distinct cases:
Real scalars: ai, ri and A are real numbers defined in the
interval Rp
def
= [0, p]. For the sake of simplicity we
will assume p integer, but not necessarily prime. The
group operation in this case is modulo-p addition. A
generic random element x is a random value extracted
uniformly in [0, p], i.e., x ∼ U(0, p). The null element
is the zero value.
Integer scalars: this is a sub-case of the previous one, where
ai, ri and A are integers in Zp
def
= [0, p]. Unless differ-
ently specified, p is not necessarily a prime number. In
practice, it is convenient to choose p = 2q (q integer)
so that modulo-p addition maps to wrap-around of a
q-bit counter.
Binary strings: ai, ri and A are binary strings of length
k. The group operation is therefore bitwise addition
(XORing). In this context a generic random element x
is a random string, i.e., a collection of bits set randomly
to 1 or 0 independently and with equal probabilities.
The null element is a string with all ’0’s.
Arrays of counters: ai, ri andA are vectors of k elements,
and each element is a q−bit counter. The group op-
eration is therefore an array of k parallel modulo−p
additions. In this context a generic random element x
is a collection of k random values < x1, x2, ..xk > ex-
tracted independently and uniformly in [0, p− 1]. The
null element is an array of zeros.
The format of the input elements ai, ri, the exact values
of the parameters (e.g., k, q) and, if applicable, the choice
of the transformation function g() depend on the particular
kind of operation (query) as detailed in §5. In the following
we will use the symbol ‘+’ to refer generically to the addi-
tion between two terms and ‘
∑
’ for multiple terms, without
specifying the group operation.
2.2 Description
The central aspect of the GCR method is that RS is con-
structed in a way that guarantees the zero-sum condition,
i.e., the composition of random elements across all users
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of a “complete” secure procedure with secret intermediate results (a)
and a sequence of “elementary” secure operations chained by public intermediate results (b).
sums up to the null element:
n∑
i=1
ri = 0. (1)
Moreover, the generation of RS ensures that the individual
ri’s can not be inferred by other players — provided that
the number of colluding players remains below the colluding
threshold l. Each player Pi then shares with other players
(e.g., via a central collector) the sum of data plus random
elements, i.e., vi = ai+ri, which serves as the public input to
the computation. When all input elements vi are collected,
the value of A is obtained by summing them all, formally:
n∑
i=1
vi =
n∑
i=1
(ai + ri) =
n∑
i=1
ai +
n∑
i=1
ri = A+ 0 = A (2)
Note that the value of A can be reconstructed only when the
inputs from all players have been collected: it is sufficient
that a single player (among those that have contributed to
generate the RS r) fails to provide its input element to pre-
vent the computation of A. This is the main disadvantage
of GCR compared to SSS, as discussed later in §3.3.
RS generation Hereafter we describe how each generic
player Pi (i = 1 . . . n) constructs its random element ri in
cooperation with other players, so as to collectively build the
RS r. Note that the RS generation procedure can be run
in parallel by all players and is completely asynchronous.
Each random element is initially set to the null element,
i.e., ri = 0. Each player Pi extracts l + 1 random variables
xi,j (j = 1 . . . l + 1) and computes their sum yi
def
=
∑
j xi,j .
It calculates the additive inverse2 yi of yi and adds it to
its own random element, i.e., ri ← ri + yi. At the same
time, Pi contacts l + 1 randomly selected other players and
sends one variable xi,j to each of them: each contacted
player Pj will then increment its random element by xi,j ,
i.e., rj ← rj + xi,j . This method is secure against collusion
of up to l players. Notably, the value of l is a free parameter,
independent from the system size n, which can be tuned to
2In modular arithmetic the additive inverse y of y is the
element that satisfies y + y = 0. For real numbers in [0, p],
y = p− y + 1, while for binary strings y = y.
trade-off communication overhead with robustness to collu-
sion — both scale linearly in l.
Computation phase. With GCR the computation is
basically a summation over n public inputs, the vi’s, and
no particular constraint applies to the aggregation method
which can be centralized or distributed. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume in the following a fully centralized scheme,
with a single master — not necessarily a player — that is
in charge of launching the query, collecting the n public in-
puts, computing the result and finally publishing it to all the
players. Another possible option is tree-based aggregation:
players are arranged into a tree, where each node collects the
inputs from its children and sends the summation result to
its parent node, until the root computes and publishes the
final result. More sophisticated peer-to-peer method can
also be adopted at the cost of some additional coordination
overhead. The point to be taken is that the GCR method is
oblivious to the particular input aggregation scheme.
2.3 Extension to multiplication
It is straightforward to adapt the GCR scheme to support
multiplication of positive integers. First, the input and out-
put data ai, ri and A must be defined over the multiplicative
group [1, p] with p a prime number: primality guarantees
that each element has a unique multiplicative inverse ele-
ment (note the difference with additive GCR which does not
require primality of p). Second, all modulo-p additions are
replaced by modulo-p multiplications. Third, the balancing
constraint eq. (1) is replaced by:
n∏
i=1
ri = 1 (3)
In this way we obtain a multiplicative variant of the addi-
tive sharing scheme, which to the best of our knowledge was
never considered in previous literature. It is important to
remark that GCR can support either addition or multipli-
cation, but it can not compose addition and multiplication
operations without reconstructing and resharing values. In
the secret evaluation scheme, it is therefore not computa-
tionally complete.
Finally, note that multiplicative GCR can not take zero as
private input, as that would automatically force to zero also
the public output, i.e., ai = 0 ⇒ vi = ai · ri = 0 ∀ri, there-
fore leaking the private value. In practice, before launching
a secret multiplication, one can easily check for the presence
of zero inputs, e.g., with a preliminary round of Conditional
Counting (see §4.2).
2.4 Sensitivity of Output
It is important to note that SMC in general (not only E-
SMC) only guarantees that no information is leaked from the
computation process. That is, it solves the problem of how
to compute a function f() on distributed data in a privacy-
preserving way. An orthogonal problem is to find out what is
safe to compute. Just learning the resulting value f() could
allow the inference of sensitive information. For example,
if the private input bits must remain secret, computing the
logical AND of all input bits is insecure in itself: if the fi-
nal result was 1, all input bits must be 1 as well and are
thus no longer secret. In SMC, it is the responsibility of
the input providers to verify that learning f() is acceptable,
in the same way as they have to verify this when using a
trusted third party. While with SMC, this analysis has to
be performed for the final result only, in E-SMC it has to
be performed individually for each step computing public
intermediate results.
A recently suggested approach to deal with this is dif-
ferential privacy [10, 15], which systematically randomizes
answers to database queries to prevent inference of sensi-
tive input data. If data records are independent, it guaran-
tees that it is statistically impossible to infer the presence
or absence of single records in the database from answers
to queries. Differential privacy and SMC complement each
other very well. Using differential privacy, it is possible to
specify a randomized output f˜() that is safe for public re-
lease. Using SMC, it is possible to actually compute f˜() in
a privacy-preserving manner, without relying on a trusted
third party. Intuitively, the stronger f() aggregates input
data, the less randomness needs to be added.
3. SYSTEM-DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we consider a number of system-level as-
pects. In particular, we propose to split the GCR opera-
tion into an offline generation of RS and online aggrega-
tion phase, and show how joins and leaves of nodes can be
handled efficiently. We also compare the GCR scheme to
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, which, among the existing
alternatives for performing SMC, allows the most efficient
solutions.
3.1 Offline generation of Random Sets
One key advantage of GCR is that the process of gen-
erating the RS is completely decoupled — and can be run
independently — from the actual computation round. This
has important implications for the design of a massive-scale
system, enabling efficient management of the communica-
tion load and minimal response delay. We devise a system
where lists of RS are generated offline and stored for later
use. At any time, each player Pi has available a collection of
random elements ri[u], indexed in u, which can be readily
used for future computation rounds. The communication
protocol must ensure that the RS indexing is univocal and
synchronized across all players. During the online computa-
tion phase, the query command broadcasted by the central
master will indicate explicitly the RS index to be used for
the production of the public inputs vi’s.
Performing RS generation offline brings several advan-
tages. First, it minimizes the query response delay down
to the same value of an equivalent cleartext summation.
Second, it allows to reduce the impact of communication
overhead onto the network load by scheduling the RS gener-
ation process in periods of low network load (e.g., at night
or week-end). Moreover, generation of multiple RS can be
batched, meaning that in a single secure connection (typ-
ically SSL over TCP) two players can exchange multiple
<variable,index> pairs {xi,j [u], u} which collectively build
a collection of RS {r[u]}. This greatly reduces the com-
munication overhead associated to connection establishment
(handshaking, authentication, key exchange, etc.).
3.2 Joining and leaving
In the GCR scheme, the set of players participating in the
computation round must match exactly the set of players
that have previously built the RS: the final result will not be
reconstructed if the two sets differ by even a single element.
If RSs are generated offline, the set of players might have
changed during the interval between the generation of r[u]
and its consumption in a query. It would be very impractical
to trash all pre-computed RSs upon every new player joining
or leaving the system — an event not infrequent for systems
with many players. Fortunately this is not necessary and
each legacy RS can be incrementally adjusted upon new join
or leave with only l + 1 operations.
When a new player Pi joins the system, it learns from
other players the index range currently in use {u1 . . . u2}
(note this information is public) and computes a set of ran-
dom variables xi,j [u] for j = 1 . . . l + 1 and u ∈ {u1 . . . u2}.
It then sets its local random elements as ri[u] = yi[u] (re-
call that yi =
∑l+1
j=1 xi,j [u]). Then for each index value k
it selects l + 1 other players to which it sends the individ-
ual variables xi,j [u]. Similarly, when an existing player Pi
wants to leave the system, it must first “release” its random
elements ri[u]. The simplest way to accomplish that is to
simply pass the value of ri[u] to another randomly selected
player Pj and let the latter update its local random ele-
ment as rj [u] ← rj [u] + ri[u]. Note that we are assuming a
“cooperative leaving” behavior: players release their unused
random elements to the system before leaving. However if
a player shuts down without releasing its random elements
— e.g., due to failure, power off or disconnection — all RSs
in the entire system are invalidated and become useless. In
large scale systems such events might not be infrequent, and
proper countermeasures must be adopted to minimize their
impact (e.g., node redundancy).
3.3 GCR versus Shamir’s Scheme
We now compare GCR to Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [20],
denoted by SSS. E-SMC, along with all the use cases de-
scribed in the following sections can be implemented with
either GCR or SSS. In GCR, reconstruction of public values
is implicitly done after each processing step, while in SSS
reconstruction needs to be scheduled explicitly if desired.
In SSS, a secret value s is shared among a set of n players
by generating a random polynomial f of degree t < n over
a prime field Zp, such that f(0) = s. Each player i = 1 . . . n
then receives an evaluation point si = f(i), called the share
of player i. The secret s can be reconstructed from any t+1
shares using Lagrange interpolation but is completely unde-
fined for t or less shares. Because SSS is linear, addition of
two shared secrets can be computed by having each player
locally add his shares of the two values. Multiplication of
two shared secrets requires an extra round of communica-
tion to guarantee randomness and to correct the degree of
the new polynomial [11]. Thus, a distributed multiplication
requires a synchronization round with n2 total messages.
For multiplications to work, the degree must be such that
n ≥ 2t+ 1.
There are two main advantages of SSS over GCR . First,
the basic operations for addition and multiplication accept
public, private, and also secret input data and output secret
data. That is, even without reconstructing intermediate val-
ues, it is possible to arbitrarily compose secret operations,
corresponding to Fig. 1(a). The GCR scheme allows com-
position of addition and multiplication only if intermediate
results are publicly reconstructed, because the sharing oper-
ation to be applied (additive or multiplicative) depends on
the next operation type. The second advantage of SSS is
that it realizes a (t + 1)-out-of-n threshold sharing scheme.
That is, any set of t + 1 players can reconstruct a secret,
being robust against up to n − t − 1 “missing” players. In
GCR , a single non-responsive player renders reconstruction
of secret information impossible.
While E-SMC can also be implemented with SSS, GCR
is highly optimized for online processing of queries. SSS
requires linear storage overhead (n shares to be stored for
each secret value), whereas GCR has constant storage over-
head (one random value per private input). When process-
ing the query, GCR involves zero communication overhead,
since the players just send their randomized values instead
of the original value to the aggregation node(s). In SSS,
when n players want to sum up their values, each of them
generates n shares ad-hoc and distributes them to the oth-
ers. In principle, the players could pre-generate t random
shares and distribute them in a pre-processing phase. In
the online phase, they would calculate the remaining n − t
shares using Lagrange interpolation, such that the interpo-
lated polynomials represent their actual secrets. However,
after distributing the last shares, each player still needs to
perform n− 1 additions locally and for final reconstruction,
send their shares of the sum to the aggregation node(s),
which eventually interpolates the final polynomial. It is not
obvious how to further split this process into a offline pre-
processing and an online phase similar to GCR, where a
single message and addition operation is enough.
Another advantage of GCR is that the additive scheme is
not restricted to prime fields. This allows to set the field size
to 232 or 264 and therefore use implicit 32 (64) bit register
wrap-arounds of CPU operations instead of performing an
explicit modulo operation3. Furthermore, the multiplicative
GCR scheme does not need an additional synchronization
round like SSS.
In summary, provided that intermediate results are not
sensitive, GCR allows for a much smaller storage and com-
putation overhead during the online processing phase.
4. BASIC OPERATIONS
3In general, mod(a, n) = a − n ∗ floor(a/n), which uses an
additional division, multiplication, and subtraction opera-
tion.
Here we briefly sketch some basic operations that can be
mapped to a secure addition with a public parameter and/or
a public conditional statement. As such, they can be ac-
complished directly by GCR method or any other scheme
for secure addition.
4.1 Summation
The summation of positive real scalars A =
∑
i ai, with
ai ∈ [0, p], is performed directly as explained above via
modulo-p additions. The only significant constraint is on
the value of p which must be greater than the total sum,
i.e., p > A. The method can be easily extended to han-
dle negative elements defined in [d1, d2], with d1 < 0 < d2,
by imposing a fixed shift +|d1| to all inputs ai’s and then
subtracting n|d1| from the output. Note however that sum-
mation of negative numbers is unusual in traffic monitoring.
4.2 Conditional Counting
We consider two versions of Conditional Counting (CC)
queries: “player counting” and “item counting”. In the first
version, the goal is to count how many players match a pub-
lic condition C which is explicitly announced as a public
query argument. Each player Pi sets ai to 0 or 1 depending
on whether or not it matches the condition C. Therefore CC
maps to a particular case of summation, where ai ∈ {0, 1}
and p ≥ n + 1. In the “item counting” version instead the
goal is to count the total number of items (e.g., hosts or
alarm records) matching the condition C, where multiple
items might be observed by a single player. Again, counting
maps directly to summation of integers.
CC queries can serve as a preliminary round to other more
advanced queries, e.g., to identify the presence of zero in-
puts before multiplication (see §2.3), or to discover the ex-
act number of active players before a round of Anonymous
Scheduling (see §5.4).
4.3 Histograms and max/min discovery
Each player Pi has a scalar private value bi and the prob-
lem is to derive a K-bins histogram of the distribution of the
bi’s. This can be easily achieved by using CC queries, in-
dexed in k, with condition C := Yk−1 < bi ≤ Yk, wherein the
threshold values {Yk, k = 1 . . .K} represent the bin bound-
aries. The number of CC queries is equal to the number of
bins K. However since bin boundaries are pre-determined,
the queries can be batched in a single round using an array
of K counters.
In a similar way it is possible to discover the maximum
value of the bi’s. Again, one can resort to a sequence of CC
queries where the threshold values Yk are adjusted dynami-
cally based on the previous result following a binary search.
If bi’s are integer and upper bounded by p, the maximum is
found in log2 p rounds. Note however that the results of all
intermediate queries are public, therefore this method dis-
closes more information about the bi’s distribution than just
the maximum. In a similar way it is possible to discover the
minimum.
5. ADVANCED OPERATIONS
Here we show a few examples of more advanced opera-
tions which can be mapped to E-SMC queries in combination
with specific constraints on the input data elements and/or
a proper local transformation function g(). For each of them
we illustrate a possible application for collaborative network
monitoring. This section is one of the main contributions of
the paper: to the best of our knowledge we are the first to
“interpret” the following operations as applications of SMC
using the additive sharing scheme.
5.1 Multiplication
Multiplication of positive integers can be accomplished
directly by the multiplicative version of GCR presented in
§2.3. Alternatively, the multiplication of positive real num-
bers B =
∏
i bi (for bi > 0) can be mapped to a summation
in the logarithmic domain. Each player locally computes
ai = logc bi and then the computation proceeds as a simple
summation of real numbers, leading to A =
∑
i ai. Finally,
the result is computed as B = cA. Some numerical issues
might arise when the product involves a large number of
non-unitary terms, due to the accumulation of rounding er-
rors in the representation of the logarithmic values — these
however are well studied problems.
5.2 Set Operations
In this section, we first describe how (probabilistic) set
operations can be implemented using bloom filters with any
SMC scheme that supports both, private additions and mul-
tiplications (e.g., SSS). We then outline what subpart of that
functionality can easily be implemented with GCR.
Bloom filters (BF) are powerful data structures for rep-
resenting sets [5]. A bloom filter for representing a set
S = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} of n elements is described by an array
of m bits, initially all set to 0. The BF uses k independent
hash functions h1, . . . , hk with range 1, . . . ,m. For each el-
ement x ∈ S, the bits hi(x) are set to 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. For
checking whether an element y is a member of S, we simply
check whether all bits hi(y) are set to 1. As long as the
BF is not saturated, i.e., m is chosen sufficiently large to
represent all elements, the total number of non-zero buckets
allows to accurately estimate |S|. Counting Bloom Filters
(CBF) are a generalization of BFs, which use integer arrays
instead of bit arrays. Thus, CBFs allow to represent mul-
tisets, in which each element can be represented more than
once. Note, that while a (C)BF allows to efficiently check for
element membership, it can not be used to enumerate the
contained elements, in general. Compared to state-of-the-
art approaches for privacy-preserving set operations, which
use homomorphic encryption (e.g., [14]), this allows for very
efficient and scalable solutions.
Set Union.
If each player i has a local set Si, they can construct the
union of their sets S = S1∪S2∪, . . . ,∪Sn by performing pri-
vate OR (∨) over their BF arrays. If inputs are multisets,
represented by CBFs, the aggregation operation is addition
instead of OR. Using CBFs, each player can learn the num-
ber of occurrences of specific elements across all players or
the number of other players that report each element (by
using a BF as input). From the aggregate CBF, one could,
for instance, compute the entropy of the empirical element
distribution.
Set Intersection.
In order to perform set intersection on BFs, the players
simply use the AND (∧) operation for aggregating their sets
S = S1∩S2∩, . . .∩Sn. Only buckets set to 1 in all the players’
BFs will evaluate to 1 in the aggregate BF. In this specific
scenario, it is also possible for each player i to enumerate
all elements in S simply by iterating over all x ∈ Si and
checking whether x ∈ S, since S ⊆ Si.
Set Operations with GCR.
GCR directly supports the addition operation and there-
fore set union on multisets. If the counts in each bucket
are not sensitive, the union and intersection of sets can be
computed from the public union of multisets — the inter-
section, for instance, is given by selecting all elements with
count n. However, private union and intersection directly
on sets can not be delivered by GCR. In fact, union requires
OR, i.e., a combination of addition and multiplication4 not
supported by GCR, while the problem with intersection is
that multiplicative GCR does not include 0 (see §2.3).
5.3 Anonymous publishing
The goal is to let one player P1 publish to all other players
a binary string w without revealing its identity. The string
w can be, for example, a malware payload that P1 has dis-
covered with an IDS, or the description of an attack which
was observed locally. Moreover, w could be used as a public
condition for a future Conditional Counting round (§4.2),
e.g., to discover how many other players have observed the
same event. There are several reasons why the publisher
wants to remain anonymous. First, knowing that it was
hit by the malware might be detrimental to its reputation
among customers. Second, such information might benefit
other potential attackers.
DC-nets [9] are a basic and unconditionally secure solution
for anonymous publishing. In the following, we devise an
alternative solution that does not require pair-wise shared
secrets, and deals with the problem of i) detecting collisions
and ii) scheduling the publication process to avoid collisions.
Let k denote the length of string w, and denote by C(w)
a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) control field of length
c computed on w — the need for CRC is explained be-
low. It is straightforward to map an Anonymous Publishing
round to a bit-wise summation on strings of length k + c.
The publisher P1 sets its data element to the concatena-
tion of w and C(w), i.e., a1 =< w,C(w) >, while all other
players set their data elements to null (aj = 0, j 6= 1).
Therefore the public result will return the string w in clear-
text, i.e., A = a1 =< w,C(w) >, but since the individ-
ual data elements remain unknown the identity of the pub-
lisher can not be reconstructed. Such a simple approach
works only if exactly one player attempts to publish in the
computation round: if two (or more) players P1 and P2 at-
tempt to publish different strings, we have a collision —
i.e., the computed result will be the combination A =<
w1 ⊕ w2, C(w1) ⊕ C(w2) > (’⊕’ for bit-wise summation)
from which neither of the elements w1, w2 can be derived.
However the collision can be easily revealed by CRC failure
as in general C(w1 + w2) 6= C(w1) ⊕ C(w2). The “colli-
sion recovery” procedure can simply foresee the repetition
of new anonymous publishing rounds associated to a back-
off scheme to avoid that the same players collide again in
the next round — a mechanism conceptually equivalent to
Slotted-Aloha.
4Note that with a, b being bits, a ∨ b = a + b − 2ab and
a ∧ b = ab.
A simple“detection and recovery”approach is not effective
when the instantaneous rate of publishing attempts is high
— this is of particular concern in large-scale system with
many players (n >> 1) and/or in presence of correlated at-
tempts (e.g., a spreading malware payload caught simulta-
neously by different domains). In such cases it is preferable
to adopt a “collision prevention” method by orderly schedul-
ing the publishing rounds for different players. This can
be achieved by a single round of anonymous scheduling, as
explained below.
5.4 Anonymous scheduling
The problem is defined as follows. Out of the total n play-
ers, a subset of m < n “active” players are ready to perform
a given action, e.g., anonymous publishing. The problem is
then to schedule the m active players without knowing nor
revealing their identities. This apparently difficult task can
be easily accomplished by bit-wise summation over strings
of size k >> m. At the query round, the inactive players
set their data elements to the null string, while each active
player Pi extracts uniformly a random integer qi ∼ U(1, k)
and then builds its data element ai with a single ’1’ at the
qi-th position and all other bits set to ’0’. The bitmap length
k must be set large enough to ensure that bit-collision prob-
ability — i.e., two or more players independently picking the
same random value qi — is kept acceptably low.
Assuming that no bit-collision has occurred, the final (pub-
lic) result A is a bitmap with m ’1’s and k −m ’0’s. Upon
learning A, each active player Pi checks whether the bit in
the qi position is set to ’1’, and if so it counts the num-
ber of ’1’s in the preceding positions, say µi, from which he
learns it has been scheduled in the successive (µi + 1)−th
query round. If otherwise the qi-th bit is ’0’, Pi infers that
a collision has occurred and waits for the next scheduling
round.
Note that in case of bit-collisions the round does not com-
pletely fail: if collisions involves only two (or any even num-
ber of) players, the colliding players will simply wait for
the next scheduling query. If three (or any odd number of)
players have collided on the same q−th bit, they would again
collide in the q−th query round. However this is not a se-
rious problem as far as collisions in the query rounds can
be detected and recovered (e.g., by CRC failure in case of
Anonymous Publishing).
The number of active players m is relevant to the set-
ting of the bitmap length k (k >> m). One conservative
approach is to simply assume the worst case m = n. Alter-
natively, a preliminary Conditional Counting query (§4.2)
might be launched to discover the exact value of m. The
latter approach has also another advantage: with knowledge
of m, the occurrence of bit-collisions can be easily revealed
by comparing to the number of ’1’s in the final result, i.e.,
|A|1. In fact, the difference m − |A|1 equals to the number
of colliding players. For example, m− |A|1 = 1 implies that
only a two-player collision has occurred, and the master can
decide to validate the current scheduling round — implic-
itly deferring the two colliding players to a future scheduling
round — or to invalidate it and immediately re-launch a new
scheduling round.
6. RELATED WORKS
SMC is a cryptographic framework introduced by Yao [22]
and later generalized by Goldreich et al. [13]. SMC tech-
niques have been widely used in the data mining community.
For a comprehensive survey, please refer to [1]. Roughan
et al. [19] first proposed the use of SMC techniques for a
number of applications relating to traffic measurements, in-
cluding the estimation of global traffic volume and perfor-
mance measurements [18]. In addition, the authors identi-
fied that SMC techniques can be combined with commonly-
used traffic analysis methods and tools, such as time-series
algorithms [2] and sketch data structures.
However, for many years, SMC-based solutions have mainly
been of theoretical interest due to impractical resource re-
quirements. Only recently, generic SMC frameworks op-
timized for efficient processing of voluminous input data
have been developed [4, 8]. Today, it is possible to pro-
cess hundreds of thousands of elements distributed across
dozens of networks within few minutes, for instance to gen-
erate distributed top-k reports [6]. While these results are
compelling, they stick to the completely secret evaluation
scheme. Our work aims at boosting scalability even further
by relaxing the secrecy constraint for intermediate results.
As such, our approach can be applied only in cases where the
disclosure of intermediate results is not regarded as critical
— a quite frequent case in practical applications. Moreover,
we aim at optimizing the sharing scheme for fast computa-
tion in the online phase.
When it comes to analyzing traffic data across multiple
networks, various anonymization techniques have been pro-
posed for obscuring sensitive local information (e.g., [21]).
However, these methods are generally not lossless and intro-
duce a delicate privacy-utility tradeoff [17]. Moreover, the
capability of anonymization to protect privacy has recently
been called in question, both from a technical [7] and a legal
perspective [16].
7. CONCLUSIONS
The use of SMC techniques has recently been proposed
to overcome the inhibiting privacy concerns associated with
inter-domain sharing of network traffic data. However, the
cost at which the cryptographic privacy guarantees of SMC
are bought is tremendous. Although the design and im-
plementation of basic SMC primitives have recently been
optimized, processing time for queries is still in the order
of several minutes and involves significant communication
overhead.
In this paper, we further boost the performance of privacy-
preserving network monitoring by two means. Firstly, we
identify that perfect secrecy of intermediate results is not
required in many cases. That is, we advocate the use of
“elementary” (as opposite to “complete”) secure multiparty
computation (E-SMC) procedures for traffic monitoring. E-
SMC supports only simple computations with private in-
put and public output, i.e., they can not handle secret input
nor secret (intermediate) output. Secondly, we separate the
computation into an offline and an online phase. Our pro-
posed scheme GCR is based on additive secret sharing and
pre-generates random secret shares during the offline phase
with only constant storage overhead. In the online phase,
GCR allows to process actual queries with zero communi-
cation overhead. This enables adoption of SMC techniques
on massive scales, both in terms of input data volume and
number of participants. In the second part, we introduce
a number of high-level primitives supported by GCR that
cover a wide range of use cases in network monitoring, in-
cluding the private generation of histograms, set operations,
and anonymous publishing.
In future work, we will evaluate GCR on real network se-
tups and study hybrid approaches combining GCR with SSS
to provide scalability and functional completeness.
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